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7	In Limited Scope			
8	Attorneys for Petitioner, MYLEA LOGIN			
9				
10	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND OF THE COUNTY OF MENDOCINO			
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12	MYLEA LOGIN,	Case No.: 23FL00613		
13	Petitioner,	PETITIONER'S BRIEF RE PROCEDURE & JURISDICTION		
14	vs.			
15	CARLOS ALBERTO ESPARZA DE	APJ: Hon. Patrick Peckin Dept: C		
16	LA TORRE, Respondent.	Date: 06/11/2024 Time: 9:30am		
17				
18	I. FACTUAL A	AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY		
19	I. <u>FACTUAL</u>	AND I KOCEDUKAL IIISTOK I		
20	Petitioner, MYLEA LOGIN (here	einafter "Mother"), and Respondent, CARLOS		
21	ALBERTO ESPARZA DE LA TORRE (	(hereinafter "Father") have one child of their marriage,		
22	II FANA FSPAR7A I OGIN (hereinafter	r "Ileana") (age 5) Mother filed a Request for a		
23	ILEANA ESPARZA LOGIN (hereinafter "Ileana") (age 5). Mother filed a Request for a			
24	Domestic Violence Restraining Order against Father on August 15, 2023. The court issued a			
25	temporary restraining order, protecting both Mother and Ileana from Father, with no contact or			
26	visitation to Father pending a hearing. Because Father lives in Mexico, Mother had to facilitate			
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1	service through the Service Aspects of the Hague Convention, which require her to serve				
2	Father through the central authority. Service through the central authority can take up to a yea				
3	for service. Father became aware of Mother Request for a Domestic Violence Restraining				
4	Order in early 2024 and retained counsel to represent him at the hearing on April 2, 2024.				
5	At the hearing on April 2, 2024, the court continued the DVRO hearing, appointed				
6	minor's counsel, Mr. Daniel Beck, and inquired as to whether Father waives any defect of				
7	service of the DVRO. Father's counsel did not waive defect of service. Mother's DVRO was				
8 9	continued pending service though the central authority. The court set a continued hearing for				
10	April 25, 2024.				
11	Prior to this hearing, Father, by and through his counsel, filed a "Motion to Quash for				
12	Lack of Jurisdiction" on March 26, 2024. In the motion, Father requests that the court dissolve				
13	the restraining order for lack of jurisdiction, and cites CCP Section 418.10(a)(1) in order to				
14	quash service of summons. A hearing on Father's Motion to Quash was set for April 25, 2024.				
15	At the hearing on April 25, 2024, Father's counsel argued that the court lacked				
16 17	jurisdiction to hear Mother's Request for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order because				
17	jurisdiction lies with Mexico and there are custody orders out of Mexico. No custody orders				
19	have been submitted for registration by Father. The court provided its preliminary analysis on				
20	the Motion to Quash, UCCJEA jurisdiction, and temporary emergency jurisdiction, but				
21	determined it had yet to complete research on this subject at this time. Mother's counsel argued				
22	that there were serious procedural deficiencies, including a lack of service of the Motion to				
23	Quash, lack of service of the Request for a DVRO, and no submission for the registration of out				
24					
25	of state custody orders. The court indicated that it was unclear whether it should address the				
26 27	Request for a DVRO aspect first, but noted that the cases seemed to suggest that where there is				
27 28	IRMO LOGIN & DE LA TORRE     PETITIONER'S BRIEF       Case no. 23FL00613     Page 2				

1	a credible demonstration of domestic violence, the cases suggest that the court should exercise				
2	jurisdiction.				
3	In order to resolve some of the procedural issues, both counsel agreed to accept email				
4	service of the unserved pleadings. Father accepted email service of Mother's Request for a				
5	Domestic Violence Restraining Order, which was effectuated, and Mother accepted service of				
6	Father's Motion to Quash, which was effectuated. The court then expressed its concern for				
7 8	priority of the issues; i.e. which to be heard first, noting there's an integral connection on the				
9	issue of whether there is a valid judgment/order that can be enforce, and Mother's allegations				
10	of Domestic Violence. The court continued the status conference to June 11, 2024, continued				
11	the temporary orders, and requested that counsel provide briefings to the court as to what				
12	should happen next procedurally by June 4, 2024.				
13	II. LEGAL ARGUMENT				
14	A. THE COURT SHOULD HEAR THE REQUEST FOR A DVRO BECAUSE IT IS				
15	THE ONLY ACTION BEFORE THE COURT THAT HAS MERIT AND IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT, THERE IS NO REGISTRATION OF A				
16	MEXICO ORDER, THE MOTION TO QUASH IS MOOT AND LACKS MERIT, AND THE COURT HAS AMPLE AUTHORITY TO HEAR THE DVRO				
17	PURSUANT TO TEMPORARY EMERGENCY JURISDICTION.				
18	I. <u>The Request for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order is the Only Action</u>				
19 20	Properly Before the Court.				
20	At this time, the only action properly before the court that holds any merit is Mother's				
22	Request for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order (hereinafter "DVRO"). At the hearing on				
23	April 25, 2024, Father's counsel agreed to service of the DVRO via email, which was				
24	effectuated on April 25, 2024. Therefore, Father has been properly served with Mother's				
25	DVRO. As a matter of policy, the DVRO should be heard as soon as possible because it deals				
26	<i>D</i> (recting a matter of poincy, the <i>D</i> (reconstruction for heard as soon as possible because it deals				
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with emergency issues and holds priority. As a matter of procedure, it is the only action that
can be heard by this court because Father's motion to quash service of summons is now moot
and lacks merit, procedurally deficient, and there has been no application for registration of any
orders out of Mexico, as explained in more detail below. The DVRO is the *only* action before
this court.

## a. <u>Father's motion to quash service of summons is moot, lacks merit, and is</u> procedurally deficient.

On March 26, 2024, Father filed a Motion to Quash "for lack of jurisdiction," citing 9 CCP § 418.10(a)(1) in order to quash service of summons, and therefore lacking jurisdiction. 10 11 CCP § 418.10(a)(1) states that a party may serve and file a notice of motion to "quash service 12 of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her." Father argues 13 that the court should quash service of summons for lack of service and lack of personal 14 jurisdiction over Father because he is a non-resident and has no contacts with the United States. 15 He further argues that the court does not have personal jurisdiction over Mother because she 16 has no significant ties with the State of California to implicate personal jurisdiction over 17 Mother, and does not live in Mendocino County. Father then attempts to seemingly include an 18 19 out of state custody order out of Mexico without an application to register the orders and an 20 arrest warrant out of Mexico.

In the first instance, Father has accepted service of the DVRO via email, so the issue of defective service is now moot and holds no merit. There is no longer a basis to quash service of the summons due to defective service as service has been properly effectuated as of April 25, 2024.

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1	In the second instance, Father's argument that the court has no personal jurisdiction				
2	over a non-resident defendant who has no ties to the State of California conveniently leaves of				
3	the court's ability to take jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in certain circumstances;				
4	e.g. despite having no ties with the State of California when the child of the parties is present				
5	<sup>5</sup> in the State of California and involved in a domestic violence action. <i>A.H. v. Superior</i> (				
6	(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504; In re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin & Sanchez (2011) 191				
7	Cal.App.4th 1015; In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478. "[T]he requirements				
8 9	8				
10	when, in a court having subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute, the out-of-state parent is				
11	given notice and an opportunity to be heard" In re Marriage of Leonard (1981) 122				
12	Cal.App.3d 443, 459.				
13	Further, the UCCJEA expressly allows California courts to exercise temporary				
14	emergency jurisdiction if a child is present in the state and there is an emergency need to				
15					
16	protect the child from abuse. A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504; In re C.T.				
17	(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 101; In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508. In the present case,				
18	Mother and the minor child have been present in the State of California since August 2023,				
19	nearly a year, satisfying the court's ability to take jurisdiction over the parties and minor child				
20	because of the minor child's presence in California, as well as the court's ability to exercise				
21	temporary emergency jurisdiction in the action due to the emergency need to protect the child,				
22	and Mother, from the abuse alleged in Mother's DVRO.				
23	As a matter of policy, California retains a substantial interest in protecting its residents				
24 25	and minor children that are present in the state from domestic violence. If a defendant was able				
26	to contest jurisdiction because they are not a resident of the state, when both Mother and the				
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1	child have been present in the State of California, it would completely prevent the State's					
2	ability to protect its residents and minor children that are present within the State. Father's					
3	argument that the court cannot assert personal jurisdiction over him in order to protect Mother					
4	and the minor children directly contradicts policy and the law.					
5	In the third instance, Father's argument that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over					
6	Mother has no merit as Mother is present in the State of California, has been present in					
7 8	California since August 2023, and holds residence in California. Mother has a residence in					
9	Mendocino County, which is currently protected under the Temporary Emergency Restraining					
10	Order. Mother provided an address in Chico in order to provide an address to the court for					
11	mailing and still ensure her actual address is protected from Father. Further, the child and					
12	Mother have been present in the State of California for over 6 months, affording the court to					
13	take UCCJEA jurisdiction.					
14	b. <u>There is no application to register any orders out of Mexico.</u>					
15 16	Father's attempt to include any orders out of Mexico in a motion to quash is					
17	procedurally deficient and violates due process. A motion to quash under CCP 410.18 does not					
18	permit for registration of foreign custody orders and therefore cannot be considered by the					
19	court. There has been no attempt to register any foreign custody orders, and the consideration					
20	of foreign custody orders without the proper procedure for registration violates Mother's due					
21	process rights to object to a registration. Therefore, because there has been no application for					
22	registration of foreign custody orders filed or served, any foreign custody orders cannot be					
23	considered and are not before the court.					
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27 28	IRMO LOGIN & DE LA TORRE PETITIONER'S BRIEF					
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1	II. The Court has Ample Authority to Make a Determination on Mother's Request				
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2	for a Domestic Violence Restraining Order Pursuant to Temporary Emergency				
3	Jurisdiction and is Given Priority.				
4	As indicated above, the UCCJEA expressly allows California courts to exercise temporary				
5	emergency jurisdiction if a child is present in the state and there is an emergency need to				
6 7	protect the child from abuse. A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504; In re C.T.				
8	(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 101; In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508. In the present action,				
9	Mother has implicated the court's ability to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction under				
10	Family Code § 3424 in order to protect the child from abuse, as alleged in her Request for a				
11	DVRO.				
12	Even if another state has jurisdiction over the child, the California court may still exercise				
13	temporary emergency jurisdiction to address immediate safety concerns before deferring to the				
14	home state for a final custody determination. A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th				
15	504. Once temporary emergency jurisdiction is invoked, the California court can make				
16 17	necessary orders in connection with domestic violence restraining orders to protect the child.				
18	Id. Therefore, in the present case, the potential knowledge or actual knowledge of a foreign				
19	custody order [which is disputed and not before this Court] does not prevent a California court				
20	from asserting temporary emergency jurisdiction to address safety concerns and protect the				
21	minor child.				
22	Last, Requests for Domestic Violence Restraining Orders are given priority by statute. Cal.				
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24	Fam. Code § 244. DVROs "shall be set for trial at the earliest possible date and shall take				
25	precedence over all other matters, except older matters of the same character, and matters to				
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1	which special precedence may be g	given by law." <i>Id</i> . Therefore, as a matt	er of law, Mother's
2	Request for a DVRO has priority a	nd shall be set at the earliest possible	date.
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4		LAW OFFICES OF BJ FADEM	& ASSOCIATES
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6	Dated: <u>6/4/2024</u>	<i>Tika Lee</i> Erika Lee, Esq.	
7		Erika Lee, Esq. Attorney for Respondent	
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